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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Egrett aircraft, made by Grob of Germany, has an all composite wing 
comprising CFc/Nomex sandwich skins, full length CFC main spar caps and GFRP main 
and auxiliary spar webs. It also has short inboard CFC auxiliary spar caps. It has fine 
aluminium wircs woven into the surface for protection. It has an integral fuel tank using the 
CFWnomex skins as the upper and lower tank walls, and lies between the forward auxiliary 
spar and the forward of the two main spar webs. The fuel tank is not 'bagged', ie it is in 
effect a wet wing tank. It has conventional capacitive type fuel gauging. 
The aimaft has been cleared to IFR standards and so required full lightning 
protection and demonstration that it would survive the lightning environment. Grob Aircraft 
Company, with Culham Lightning Test and Technology as consultants, designed the 
lightning protection for the wing (and also far the remainder of the aircraft). An inner wing 
test sample (which included a part of the fuel tank) was tested at the Culham Lightning 
Simulation Laboratory as part of the proving programme. This paper describes the 
protection design, the testing process and indicates the intrinsic structural features that 
improve lightning protection design and which therefore minimise the weight and cost of any 
added lightning protection components. 
fuel systems for aircraft. 
The design and testing procedures must meet the requirements of AC20-53A(') for 
2 BASIC WING DESIGN LIGHTNING CONSIDERATIONS 
The wing cross section is shown in Figure 1, where the construction, comprising 
CFC/Nomex, CFC spar caps, and glass fibre reinforced plastic (GFRP) spar webs, is fully 
cocured and bonded, and virtually no fasteners are used. The only metallic components 
originally in the design were the fuel gauge wires (A), the aileron operating rod (B), a drive 
cable for the flaps (C), electric wires to the wing tip light, Pitot and other wing mounted 
electrical items @), and fuel and vent pipes (E). Item (C) only runs a very short distance 
along the wing (there are only inboard flaps) and fuel gauge wiring ran only as far as the 
outer-most gauge, about half way along the wing. Apart from these, the main components 
of the wing which would carry lightning current would be the main spar caps which are solid 
0' carbon lay up, and to a less extent the skins, but these were very thin. Inboard, the CFC 
spar caps of the auxiliary spars could in principle carry current. (The auxiliary spar caps 
were shown later on to be completely insulated from the rest of the wing and so played no 
part in lightning protection.) 
The hazards from,lightning can be divided into three main areas: 
a) structural damage (excluding fuel explosions) to the wing affecting flight 
safety. 
b) fuel vapour explosions in or around the tanks and pipes. 
c) excessive induced voltages causing (b) or damaging the aircraft electrical 
system. 
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Apart fim some tests on 'coupon' samples of the wing skins and fuel tank access 
doors, the remainder of the lightning protection design evolved by detailed consideration of 
the wing design, so making optimum use of the wing structure for protection. 
3 PROTECI'ED WING DESIGN AS TESTED 
3. I 
3.2 
3.3 
Examination of the fuel tank design together with the results of the coupon tests 
suggested that the tank was unlikely to spark as a result of Zone 3 conduction 
curnnts or swept stroke 2A/2B attachment to the wing. However, because of the 
novel features of the design, a simple similarity argument could not be made, and 
then wen also three possible sparks site zones which could only be qualfied by test. 
Two of these are shown in Figun 2 and involved first, possible sparking at the 
inboard close-out of the tank, and secondly at a bonded panel in the undercarriage 
bay area of the tank. ("he third one is associated with the fuel gauge systems and 
will be discussed later.) Sparking at the fuel tank access doors had already been 
shown to be absent from coupon tests to the door and its immediate surround, so this 
was not to be consided during the main tests. Camera and fibre optic light sensors 
were placed in the wing as shown in Figure 3 in order to specifically cover the 
identified sites, but to cover the whole tank as well. 
The tests showed that with both Zone 3 and Zone 2ADB tests, no sparking occurred 
in the tank area. This conclusion required very close attention to the test details since 
a lot of stray light leaked in through partially transparent GFRP in areas of the tank 
not covered by opaque sealant. 
Fuel and vent pipes for tank. To avoid problems with these, low electrical 
conductivity "static dissipating'' pipes were used to prevent the risk of current flow in 
them and so to prevent sparking at joints, etc. 
Fuel gauge wiring. As previously discussed, the fuel gauges contribute a potential 
fuel ignition hazard owing to the possibility of sparking between the fuel gauges and 
the CFC skins locally. This depends upon the magnitude of the voltage generated by 
current flow in the wing material and the insulation level at the gauge. The 
magnitude of voltage generated in the fuel gauge wiring is determined critically by 
the position of the wins in relation to good conducting structure, in this case being 
the mass of 0' CFC comprising of the main spar caps (see Figure 1). Modifications 
to wiring positions were made both externally, where it was recommended that the 
wiring outside the wing was screened, and inside, when it was demonstrated that 
voltages could be brought low enough by careful positioning of the fuel gauge wires 
right in the comer of the spar cap/spar web as shown in Figure 1, where (a) shows 
the original position and (b) the improved position. The measurements shown in 
Table 1 demonstrated the advantage of careful use of structure and wiring location. 
The original configuration voltage (extrapolated to 'full threat') was 3440 resistive 
volts and 18kV inductively generated voltage, reducing to 2600 resistive and 4.6kV 
inductive after the m e c a t i o n .  No added material was needed within the wing to 
secure this improvement, only repositioning of the wiring tight within the comer of 
the spar cap/web. The reduction in inductive voltage (ie, the component of voltage 
proportional to di/dt) is very marked, and suggests that di/dt coupling occurs along 
part of the wing internally; probably in the region between the undercarriage bay and 
the wing mot where the skin is presumably insulated from the main spar caps as well 
as from the auxiliary spar caps. Evidence for this was the reduction in di/dt voltage 
when the skin was joined to the spar cap at the root by the add on copper sheets. 
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With adequate insulation at the fuel gauges, the induced voltages will be insufficient 
to cause sparking and therefore no fuel ignition. 
kchced v d ~ g e s  in wing tip and Pitot wiring. The wiring runs from the wing tip 
light and from a Pitot tube well out on the wing to the wing mot. insuiaiion is i i i  
practical for the system, and the risk of a very high current injection into the aircraft 
electrical system is very serious unless precautions are taken. The protection method 
is an aluminium tube running the full length of the wing in an electrically continuous 
length, bonded to the light surround at the outer edge and to the fuselage ground 
plane at the inner, with the wires inside. By this method, almost complete 
elimination of the induced voltage occurs except for a residual resistive voltage 
resulting fmm current flow in the tube. This was proved by the test in which the 
current along the tube, and the voltage inside were measured during a current pulse to 
the wing, and shown to be in Ohm's law agreement with the tube current and 
resistance, ie, the current pulse of 67k amps max produced a voltage of 200V in a 
tube of 3mR. 
The presence of the tube has an effect on current flow in the wing, especially at late 
times during the pulse as shown in the following section. 
C m n t  sharing and current waveforms in wing bonding components. Table 2 
shows the current distribution between the various connections to the wing at the root 
end, these tests were made mainly using oscillatory pulses of approximately 50kA 
peak. This table shows that the forward and rear auxiliary spars are not in electrical 
contact with the wing, so the lightning current is taken only by four components; 
upper spar, lower spar, aileron rod, and the lightning protection tube in the ratio of 
30%. 39.546, 1796, 13.5%. However tests with a unidirectional Component A pulse 
through the whole of the wing sample produced a current pulse in the tube like 
figure 4 of 1280~s long compared with the Component A current pulse of 
approximately 4 6 0 ~ s  total length. 
The tube current rose to 67kA at 21Ms after the start of the pulse and had a very flat 
top, at which time the Component A current pulse was only 50kA; ie, the tube 
current was larger than the applied current pulse, since an eddy current had been 
established in the wing between the CFC and the metal. 
This is a familiar phenomenon with CFC structures incorporating high conductivity 
components such as a metal tube. 
4 
3.4 
3.5 
COMMENTS ON DESIGN OF WINGFUEL TANK AFFECTING 
CERTIFICATION FOR LIGHTNING 
In Section 2 of this paper, 3 types of potential hazard were mentioned as being 
specifically applicable to CFC structures. The first was structural damage affecting flight 
safety resulting from an attachment. Tests carried out prior to and during this test procedure 
(but not reported here) showed that the CFC/Nomex/CFC material, with aluminium wires in 
the outer ply is virtually unaffected by Zone 2A lightning attachments apart from minor 
tufting at the the arc attachment points. Owing to the absence of metal components there are 
no current concentration points to cause direct effects damage to the wing away from the arc 
attachment point either, so making it safe. 
The second hazard was fuel vapour ignition from sparking within the tank. Tests on 
coupons had previously verified that Zone 2A attachments to the fuel tank access panels did 
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not cause sparking within the tank, and tests at Culharn prior to the main test using an infra- 
red camera had shown that Zone 2A attachments to the fuel tank upper or lower skin material 
gave a temperature rise in the inside tank wall of no more than 87T, which is safe. 
The tests reported here have shown that no sparking occurs within the tank from 
conduction tests (Zone 3) at 200kA or with Zone 2A attachments to the wing skin (near the 
undercarriage bay). The design features of special significance here are that there are no 
fasteners used in the tank region; it is a fully bonded structure with CFC/Nomex upper and 
lower skins and glass fibre forward and rearward walls. The CFC skins are unjointed in the 
tank region, since the forward GFRP auxiliary spar protects the tank from possible sparking 
at the upper skidlower skin bond line at the leading edge shown as Point A in Figure 1. 
Although some light was observed in the tests, careful exploratory work showed that 
it was light leaking through the semi transparent GFRP from minor sparking elsewhere, 
probably in the region ufr of the main spar, and also at the root end, where external surface 
sparking occurred at the wing skidspar joint prior to the addition of the copper sheet referred 
to in Section 3.3. Light leaks in the structure incorporating fibre-glass are a severe problem 
in achieving a satisfactory optical test for sparking. It would, in principle have been possible 
to use an ignitable gas test but the provision of adequate blow-out panels would have been 
very difficult in such a large volume, and the damage resulting from a mis-test would have 
stopped the test programme owing to a shattered test specimen. 
The other principle problem concerning lightning in a CFC wet wing is excessive 
induced voltage either in the fuel gauge wiring causing sparking in the fuel tank or large 
induced or injected currents in other wiring which can damage aircraft power systems, etc. 
As discussed in Section 3.3 wiring can be protected by routing and insulation where all the 
wiring and the items to which it is connected are totally inside the structure and not subject to 
direct attachment, as indeed for the fuel gauge wiring. (The use of conduit inside a fuel tank 
is very unsarisfacrory owing to the sparking problem at its bonding points, and the same 
problem applies to any other form of shielding. Conduit which is grounded one end only or 
which has an insulation break in it does not reduce the magnitude of the voltage available and 
therefore does not prevent over voltage sparks at the gauge units.) In the Egrett design, 
protection is obtained by optimum routing and adequate insulation at the gauge transmitters. 
Wiring to Pitots, stall warning devices, navigation lights can not be protected in this 
same way since they risk a direct lightning attachment. For this the Egrett design uses an 
aluminium tube which is bonded to structure and to the light surround to carry the wiring a l l  
the way into the fuselage. This method minimises the voltage induced in the wiring, and 
reduces them to a tube resistive voltage only as explained above. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The Egrett wing design achieves lightning protection by a combination of aluminium 
wire skin protection in the outer ply of the CFC/Nomex/CFC structure, a nefastener design 
including an all-bonded fuel tank structure, and low induced voltages by a) choice of 
locations of the fuel gauge wiring and b) by use of a light weight tube for the wing tip 
navigation light. A few bond straps are also required to complete the protection together 
with inboard wire screens for the wiring connection to fuselage items. 
Lightning protection of composite aircraft can be achieved, and the aircraft 
certificated with minimum increase in weight if due care and attention is given to details. The 
assistance of experienced consultancy is essential well before certification is to take place, 
and preferably at the detailed design phase, so that low weight techniques can be 
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incaporated to solve the lighming problems. Lightning is potentially a very severe 
environmental hazard to composite aircraft, but good design can minimise the weight and 
cost penalty of achieving protection. 
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TABLE I 
FUEL GAUGE VOLTAGE EXTRAPOLATED FROM -5OkA TO 200kA,140kA/~~ 
TABLE I1 
CURRENT SHARING AT WING ROOT BONDING POINTS 
I BOND POSlTION 1 MEASURED CURRENT 1 EXTRAPOLATED TO 20OkA 1 % 1 
All tests at -5OkA oscillatory except (1) using a 200kA Component A unidirectional 
Pulse. The 96 current reached was 36S% of the initial peak current, but it occurred 216p 
after the initiation of the current pulse, at which time it  was greater than the applied pulse. 
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Component A current pulse  
y I - 187kA, A I  - 2 x lo6 A2s 
. V :  49.2kA/div 
8193 lB$: YOOrt; W: (fF 731 WIG7 ll:15:Z E N  FVI: (w.. S Rflm:m 
. , . . . :  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Voltage induced i n  WLPT 
( fuse lage  region screened) 
- 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - . - - - - - - - .  
:I I 
. . . .  . . . . . . . .  : . .  . 
Component A .  
H :  160ps/cm 
V: 46.7v/div 
Fig 4 Total current in wing (upper) 
Current and voltage waveform 
in Lightning protection tube 
Total pulse  duration 4 6 0 p s  
Total pulse length 1 2 8 0 ~ s .  
49-9 
